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Civic Membership, Family Status, and the
Chinese in America, 1870s–1920s
Julie Novkov
University at Albany, SUNY
Carol Nackenoff
Swarthmore College

Chinese women and children, or their advocates, brought many legal challenges to
decrees denying them entry into the United States or seeking to deport them. Relying
on more than 150 reported habeas corpus cases decided in West Coast federal courts
between 1875 and 1924, we examine how courts helped to structure the rise of the
administrative state through controversies involving the boundaries of citizenship,
legal residency, and familial status. Cases involving those particularly vulnerable
individuals whose statuses were conditioned upon their familial bonds helped to
shape the meaning and scope of civic membership. Amid political conflict within
institutions of the American state and increasing pressure to curtail immigration, the
courts gradually ceded primary decision-making authority to administrative agents,
legalizing the administrative state. However, courts continued to supervise what
kinds of decisions administrators could make, what kinds of procedures administrators had to use, and what kinds of evidence had to be considered in order to render
legitimate the exercise of administrative discretion. Chinese women and children
seeking recognition of their citizenship or permanent residency posed what were
perceived as moral and civic dangers to the family and the state. This rendered their
direct rights claims less enforceable as administrators’ authority to determine status
expanded.

Keywords

political development; family; citizenship; Progressive Era; Chinese
immigration to the United States; gender

In this article, we will argue that controversies about whether Chinese women and
children were entitled to citizenship or residence in the United States during the
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries highlighted struggles between courts
and emerging institutions of the administrative state. These struggles concerned
who had access to courts, which institutions would make status determinations,
and who had the right to have rights that courts might acknowledge. Studying
these struggles shows how contested meanings and disputes over family and civic
membership contributed to state-building.
Our story hews somewhat to the familiar Progressive Era narrative of the
administrative state wresting power from the courts: Congress passed increasingly
restrictive immigration legislation, and federal administrative agencies gained
increasing authority and discretion to make decisions about which Chinese
immigrants and denizens could enter or remain and who would be excluded or
deported. However, we emphasize here the courts’ agency in this process and
illustrate the ways in which dilemmas over the determination of status encouraged
the development and legitimation of administrative apparatuses.1 Our review of
cases from the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit trial and appellate courts
between the late 1800s and the early 1920s reveals how judges managed, and
sometimes constrained, the growth of administrative decision making. Rather than
ceding the terrain entirely, courts maintained authority over what decisions
administrators could make, what procedures administrators had to use, and what
evidence had to be considered in order to constitute the legitimate exercise of
administrative discretion. In doing so, the courts acquiesced to Congress’s efforts to
expand and protect administrative agents’ discretionary power, but they retained
the power to determine the scope and reach of administrative authority and to
oversee the rules that administrators would have to use for making these
determinations. The courts thus contributed to the legalization of the administrative state.
We analyzed reported decisions concerning habeas petitions brought on behalf
of Chinese women and children.2 Chinese women and children seeking citizenship or permanent residency to which they were not legally entitled posed
perceived moral and civic dangers that prompted administrative policy changes
and solutions. Administrative agents’ primary task was to determine the status of
individuals seeking entry or citizenship. During the period from the 1870s and the
1920s, Congress, which was responding to popular pressure that was especially

1. See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982).
2. We investigate only reported opinions in Chinese habeas cases from California federal courts and
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases originating there. Many additional dispositions appear only in
docket records. The reported opinions do not allow generalization about the success rate of petitions.
Nonetheless, they show how federal courts established legal categories, defined rights’ boundaries, and
interpreted the Supreme Court’s frameworks.
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strong in Western states, supplied legislation that afforded administrators increasing scope to make these determinations.
One tends to think of constitutional change at the end of the 1800s as a battle
over rights and their scope. Concerns over how to manage Chinese migration
through policy, however, eventually settled into a struggle primarily over status
and how it conferred or failed to confer rights. Direct rights claims became
increasingly difficult to articulate in the face of debate over the authority of
administrators to determine status. And as vexing as questions about rights
were when they depended on determining an adult man’s status, they became
doubly problematic for women and children, whose status was often contingent upon administrators’ determinations regarding the legitimacy of their
claims about their familial relations. The courts supervised these administrative
solutions and set out the parameters within which administrators would have
the authority to make status determinations by deciding how well individual
Chinese immigrants and denizens fit judicial conceptions of family membership. As these conversations progressed, courts and administrative decision
makers seemed to be increasingly unwilling to attribute the attachment and
civic membership implied in familial relationships – under what McDonagh
describes as the republican motherhood frame – if the families themselves were
not sufficiently in tune with norms of exclusivity and national geographic
stability.3
In the next section, we outline the framework established to manage Chinese
migration. Then we address how rules shifted, allowing more administrative
management and defining administrative discretion. We examine the administrative state’s legalization through judicial opinions that established legitimate
administrative practice and the threshold questions that would determine the
location of binding authority over a person of questionable status. Struggles over
family status and civic membership thus helped to build the legalized administrative state.

Background Legal Framework and Habeas Challenges
The motivations that drove the rapid development of restrictions on Chinese
migration and residency were both racial and economic. Anti-Chinese sentiment
3. See Eileen McDonagh, “The Family-State Nexus and American Political Development: Explaining
Women’s Political Citizenship,” Polity 48 (2016): 186–204. See also McDonagh, The Motherless State:
Women’s Political Leadership and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Linda
Kerber, “The Republican Mother: Women and the Enlightenment – An American Perspective,” American
Quarterly 28 (1976): 187–205. Note also that the suspicions with which fact finders viewed alleged Chinese
familial bonds likewise undermined the implied benefits to the polity of republican motherhood, which
presumed that legitimate American families would imbue their children with American values.
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was an important spur to labor organizing in San Francisco in the 1870s and 1880s.4
Employers’ practices, including the use of immigrant laborers as strikebreakers,
fueled organized labor’s hostility to new immigrant labor.5 Anti-Chinese sentiment
also helped to shape unions’ organizing strategy (protecting jobs against newcomers), as well as their outward-looking political strategy, which included
pressing for legislative reform. The immigration question politicized the labor
movement and nationalized labor politics.6 Organized labor’s political argument
spoke in terms of “the corruption by new immigrants of American virtues,
standards, and traditions.”7
As activists sought a political remedy for the problem of unregulated immigration, the gains they made in the legislature were at first rebuffed in the courts. The
California Supreme Court struck down a number of early measures passed by the
state legislature to tax or limit Chinese immigration, claiming that this was properly
a power of the national government. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that
immigration regulation was a power of the national government alone, while
leaving undetermined where health and safety warranted the exercise of state
police power. In addition, the Supreme Court struck down California measures
enacted in 1866 and 1870 to ban the immigration of Chinese females.8 While
frustrated with the courts, opponents of Chinese immigration had more success
with Congress, which passed the Page Act in 1875, accomplishing some of the
same purposes of California’s bans on the importation of prostitutes. Pressure for
more extensive federal regulation of Chinese entry persisted, leading to new
rounds of legislative action.
Privileged expertise, too, helped frame the immigration issue in the Progressive
Era. Experts “breath[ed] life into a dominant immigration narrative that resolve[d]
competing ‘causal stories’ and help[ed to] shape concrete policy responses.”9
4. Gwendolyn Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1986), 72.
5. See Michael Goldfield, The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New
York: New Press, 1997); Herbert Hill, Black Labor and the American Legal System (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of National Affairs, 1977) on the exploitation of racial divisions in the labor force. Use of immigrant
and black labor as strikebreakers was especially pronounced in anthracite coal mining, steel, and textiles;
and Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants, 41 (see note 4 above).
6. Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants, 73, 51 (see note 4 above).
7. Ibid., 53.
8. Several federal court decisions struck down California laws measures such as head or capitation
taxes dating from the 1850s, and others struck down San Francisco ordinances. A few important examples
were People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857) (striking down the 1855 capitation tax); Lin Sing v. Washburn,
20 Cal. 534 (1862) (striking down efforts to protecting white labor from coolie labor); In re Ah Fong,
1 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (striking down the state ban on importation of Chinese women for
purposes of prostitution); and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (affirming that any such power
resided with the federal government).
9. Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 9.
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As Daniel Tichenor argues, non-incremental policy change must be understood
in part through “the privileging of fresh expertise by the nation state” in the
rationalization of new policy departures.10 Emerging elites contended that expertise and administrative leadership would counteract the ill effects of political
parties, which were seen as mobilizing immigrant and ignorant voters. Newly
professionalizing scientists, social scientists, social workers, and lawyers were
important in pressing a vision of a new American state that was centered on
administration by professionals. They were part of a constituency that worked to
combat what were seen as the insidious effects of party and the newer workingclass immigrants.11 As immigration from southern and eastern Europe contributed
to rising anti-immigrant sentiment, questions about immigrants’ suitability for
American residence and/or citizenship were linked to thinking about racial
differences.12 Imbecility, criminality, tendency to disease, and lack of capacity for
self-support all became racialized, and the incentives to move regulation of these
phenomena into the administrative sphere were strong.
From the Page Act in 1875 to the National Origins Act of 1924, policy makers
increasingly regulated the entry of persons of Chinese origin seeking to come to,
return to, or remain in the United States. The Page Act, aimed at prostitutes and
coolie labor, targeted the Chinese, as did the Chinese Exclusion Acts passed in 1882
and later years. The Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882 placed a 10-year moratorium on
the entry of Chinese laborers. The 1892 Geary Act required Chinese to acquire and
carry certificates of residence and authorized the arrest and deportation of those
lacking documentation. The Immigration Act of 1891 shifted administration to the
federal government, created the Bureau of Immigration, and lodged the Chinese
Exclusion Act’s administration in the Treasury Department. Collectors of customs
became the decision makers admitting or denying Chinese arrivals in the United
States.13 This system prevailed until the passage of the National Origins Act in 1924,
which barred Asians and Pacific Island residents from immigrating.
The Page Act restricted the entry of prostitutes, felons, and unfree labor
(as coolies were considered) into the United States.14 Alleged Chinese prostitutes
were classified as undesirables rather than criminals, which gave them fewer rights

10. Ibid.
11. Skowronek, Building a New American State, 42 (see note 1 above).
12. See Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 12–13 (see note 9 above); Desmond King, Making Americans:
Immigration, Race, and the Makings of a Diverse Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2000), 51.
13. Congressional Research Service, Report for the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, “History of the Immigration and Naturalization Service” (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1980), 8–11. The Bureau of Immigration shifted to the Department of Commerce and
Labor in 1903 and to the new Department of Labor in 1913.
14. Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 131.
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than the latter. By the 1920s, even prostitutes who claimed U.S. citizenship could
be summarily deported. Congress also denied entrance to active practitioners of
polygamy in 1891 and excluded those admitting belief in the practice in 1907.15
The anti-polygamy fervor included Muslims and Mormons, but Chinese women
were particularly suspected of involvement in polygamy or prostitution, which
affected the perceived legitimacy of Chinese unions and offspring. As Gwen
Alphonso’s work illustrates, images of family provide frames for politics, and they
also structure partisan alignments. Efforts by Chinese migrants and residents to
secure rights on the basis of familial relationships clashed with political efforts to
leverage exclusion, since politicians and policy makers were deeply suspicious
about the genuine nature of these relationships and about Chinese immigrants’
attachment to American familial norms and values. Rather than contributing to
and driving policy differentiation between political parties, the efforts by Chinese
immigrants to establish their families on the West Coast generated strong
consensus around the development of administrative solutions to the problem.16
Family has long been a core value in American immigration policy,17 shaping
immigration laws from their national inception as early as 1875. Statutes governed
the admission of adult Chinese men, but women and children attempting to enter
or remain as family members often faced a layered inquiry requiring determination
both of their status and of the status of the men to whom they were attached. When
Chinese faced orders of deportation or exclusion, they challenged the orders by
filing habeas petitions. The judicial inquiry that these petitions triggered generated
tension between the rights framework of habeas corpus, and the legislatively
established status framework that Congress had intended to manage some aspects
of immigration policy.
For all Chinese, status mattered. Independent Chinese men had to acquire
certification to establish themselves either as merchants or permitted laborers,
since the law distinguished between laborers and merchants as early as 1882;
however, administrative process could change their status. A woman classified as a
Chinese laborer who lacked proper certification (which was rarely available),
faced exclusion. However, women could also claim residency based on their
husbands’ classifications. Habeas cases could therefore allege a woman’s right to
enter or stay based on her familial connection to a man with the appropriate status.
Courts inquired about what constituted adequate proof of marriage, how to
determine the status of the man to whom a woman was connected, and whether
a man’s changing status could change his wife’s status. Lawmakers and policy
15. Immigration Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 898, Chapter 1134 Sec. 2, February 20, 1907.
16. Gwen Alphonso, “Resurgent Parenthood: Organic Domestic Ideals and the Southern Family Roots
of Conservative Ascendancy, 1980–2005,” Polity 48 (2016): 205–23.
17. See Patricia Strach, All in the Family: The Private Roots of American Public Policy (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 2007).
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interpreters considered what kinds of marriages to recognize and what kinds of
children to privilege.
Chinese immigrants aggressively filed habeas corpus petitions in order to
extricate individuals from detention and overturn orders of deportation.18 From
1891 to 1905, district and circuit courts heard more than 2600 habeas cases filed by
Chinese seeking to land or remain in the United States.19 The federal courts were
willing to hear such petitions, sometimes despite statutory language that limited
their jurisdiction or lodged final power in an appeal to an executive branch official.
Their willingness illustrates that courts understood themselves to have the power to
manage their own obligations and discretionary authority and were willing to push
back against what they viewed as administrative incursions and constitutional
transgressions. While generally upholding federal laws that prevented the entry of
Chinese immigrants and supporting administrative decisions mandating the
removal of many Chinese litigants, federal court judges also questioned detention
and deportation decisions on grounds that included procedural fairness and due
process. Courts reinforced their own status as the institutions that defined their own
power and that of administrative agencies. They articulated the legal framework
within which administrative decisions were made and legitimated.

Litigation Involving Women’s Status
Cases reported between 1874 and 1891 addressed two major issues: how women
would fit into the new legislative frameworks, and where the boundaries between
state and federal authority sat.20 The courts quickly cemented authority at the
national level. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts denied states the
authority to interpose their own regulatory regimes to deal with Chinese immigration and immigrants. Defining who could enter the United States and remain there
proved more challenging. When federal laws and policies that were designed to
limit the influx of Chinese resulted in the detention of Chinese women who
believed they should be permitted to enter or remain in the United States, case law
established how to apply these laws and policies. The courts also tried, unsuccessfully, to limit litigation.
In 1884, California’s circuit court tackled some of these questions. Under the
new rules that disfavored laborers, entry for both laborers and merchants required
procuring the necessary certificate, even if the party in question had been in the
18. When men initiated habeas petitions claiming ownership of young women as servants (who were
likely intended for prostitution), the young women winning freedom through a writ of habeas corpus were
often anything but free.
19. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, 34 (see note 14 above). Salyer located thousands of additional cases
in docket books of the Federal District Court for California.
20. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
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country previously. The court noted that “the wife or minor child of a man of
the Chinese race entitled to come to the United States…is a ‘Chinese person’ ” and
therefore could enter freely if they held their own independent certificate.21
However, if entrants could not establish their entitled status, they could rely on a
husband’s or father’s status – if the husband or father had identified them,
provided appropriate justification, and obtained official certification for them
through his certification process.22
After this initial period (1874–1891), courts and administrators established
ground rules and processes arising from the federal statutory mandates. However,
these combined efforts to clarify federal policy – by limiting the scope of Chinese
immigration and empowering administrators to make independent and authoritative status determinations – ultimately failed in their attempt to drastically limit
the courts’ need to consider habeas cases.
In the next phase, between 1892 and 1900, courts addressed how status
affected the operation of these statutes with respect to women and children.
Courts also addressed the issue of when judges would determine the critical
issue of status. Statutory reforms allowed judicial challenges of administrative
determinations, raising interpretive questions about how status functioned as a
threshold issue for access to civic rights through the habeas process. Consider Gue
Lim, who sought relief based on her status as a wife of a merchant, although she
lacked the required independent certificate of registration. The judge ruled that the
congressional statute was not designed to exclude “Chinese merchants with their
families,” as it intended to support American commerce with China, thereby
benefiting Americans.23 The ruling emphasized the courts’ authority to interpret
status and dependency, mandating judicial determination of the line between
laborers and merchants. Courts also determined what constituted a valid
Chinese marriage for immigration purposes,24 and they privileged judicial decision
making over administrative rulings in cases where a judge had previously
determined an individual’s status.25 Administrative findings prevailed if they met
judicial standards,26 but these standards were weaker than ordinary due process
guarantees.27
Between 1901 and 1910, a new administrative environment driven by
federal statutory reform gave the federal Commissioner General of Immigration
21. In re Ah Quan, 21F. 182, 186 (CC D. Cal. 1884).
22. Ibid. See also In re Chung Toy Ho and Wong Choy Sin, 42F. 398 (D. Ore. 1890).
23. United States v. Gue Lim, 83 F. 316, 140 (D. Wash 1897) at 140.
24. In re Lum Yin Ling, 59 F. 682, 683 (D. Ore. 1894) at 683.
25. United States v. Chung Shee, 66 F. 953 (N.D. Cal 1895); United States v. Chung Shee, 76 F. 951
(9th Cir. 1896). Likewise In re Gut Lun, 84 F. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1897) upheld an Arizona ruling against a woman
it had determined to be a laborer lacking a certificate.
26. See United States v. Lao Sun Hu, 85 F. 422 (N.D. Cal. 1898).
27. In re Lee Lung, 102 F. 132 (D. Ore. 1900).
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consolidated power to enforce the Chinese exclusion laws.28 Courts emphasized
administrative discretion in making status determinations, and of the nine
opinions about women’s status in this period (concerning three wives and six
alleged prostitutes), in only two were writs granted allowing entry, and one of
these was overturned on appeal. The courts largely rejected litigants’ attempts to
challenge the commissioners’ decisions through claims of inadequate evidence,
and they rejected mere claims that legal residence or citizenship could be the
basis for greater procedural protections or more substantive rights. The courts
did, however, understand marriage to be a “trumping” status, ruling, for instance,
that a female laborer who married a merchant with residency could remain
because her deportation would implicate her new husband’s rights as well
as hers.29
Questionable wifely status was different. In two cases, a woman’s claim of
marriage to an American citizen did not free her from the jurisdiction of either the
Department of Commerce and Labor or the Commissioner of Immigration.30 Under
the Geary Act, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “a proceeding may be
instituted before a commissioner,”31 placing the burden of proof on the Chinese
person to prove facts supporting the right to remain in the United States, rather than
requiring the United States to establish conclusively that the Chinese person could
be deported or denied entry.32
Over time, opportunities for successful appeals of deportation orders narrowed
as legislative changes limited courts’ jurisdiction and public concern about
Chinese prostitution increased, leading to judicial interpretive tightening. In the
first of two Ninth Circuit cases addressing prostitution in 1902, the court found that,
whatever the woman in question was, she was not a merchant and could be
deported.33 In the second opinion, engagement in prostitution classified a woman
as a laborer, enabling deportation.34 In 1907, Congress excluded prostitutes from
entering the United States, and also demanded the deportation of “any alien
28. In 1900, authority for implementing the Chinese exclusion laws and attendant federal regulations
shifted from the Customs Service to the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration (then in the Treasury
Department).
29. Tsoi Sim v. United States, 116 F. 920, 925 (N.D. Cal. 1902).
30. Hoo Choy v. North, 183 F. 92 (9th Cir. 1910); Haw Moy v. North, 183 F. 89 (9th Cir. 1910).
31. Fong Mey Yuk v. United States, 113 F. 898 (9th Cir. 1902).
32. Fong Mey Yuk v. United States, 113 F. 898 (9th Cir. 1902). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied this ruling when Yee N’Goy objected that the commissioner lacked jurisdiction over her as a legal
resident. The court confirmed that, without a certificate of registration, she had to prove her right of
residence. Yee N’Goy v. United States, 116 F. 333 (9th Cir. 1902).
33. Lee Ah Yin v. United States, 116 F. 614, 615–16 (9th Cir. 1902).
34. Wong Ah Quie v. United States, 118 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1902). A Washington district court sympathized
with her flight from prostitution by entering a marriage, likely arranged by a benevolent society. The court
rejected the deportation order; it was reinstated by the circuit court. United States v. Ah Sou, 138 F. 775
(9th Cir. 1905).
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woman or girl who shall be found an inmate of a house of prostitution or practicing
prostitution” within three years of her entry, even if her initial entry was legal.35 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected two appeals involving suspected prostitutes
in 1909 and 1910 that turned on the sufficiency of the evidence, upholding
administratively ordered deportations.36
Perhaps reacting to the trajectory of public sentiment and Congress’s implicit
expression of disapproval through its limits on their jurisdiction, the courts became
increasingly unwilling to question the sufficiency of evidence supporting deportation, whether a judge or administrative agent had weighed it. Resident Chinese
women’s legal status was never secure; they were always subject to administrative
inquiries about whether their current or past status warranted deportation. While
women were particularly scrutinized upon any hint of involvement in prostitution,
they potentially faced administrative review of their legal status at any time, and as
pressure to restrict immigration grew, they had increasing difficulty in interposing
effective claims about rights in order to question administrative decisions about
status.
Between 1911 and 1919, women suspected of prostitution faced deportation
through challenge to their initial entry, even if they had lived a long time in the
United States. They were simply undesirables. Some women entered the country
as wives, but their marriages were questioned long after they had arrived.
Without status as legitimate wives who were borrowing their husbands’ status as
citizens or legal residents, women had few legitimate grounds for establishing
U.S. residency. Hence, widows or women who had been abandoned by their
husbands were at risk. Courts decided when women could challenge adverse
determinations of their wifely status, outlining the administrative boundaries of
legitimate procedure and limiting the women’s rights to independent judicial
review.
Absent egregious procedural violations, Chinese women accused of prostitution found little refuge in the courts.37 Women who resisted deportation by
claiming marriage also had to show that there had been a procedural error.38
While the administrative proceedings did not need to meet ordinary due process
standards, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that if a deportation proceeding
35. 34 Stat. 898, February 20, 1907.
36. Looe Shee v. North, 170 F. 566 (9th Cir. 1909). The Supreme Court invalidated the statute’s criminal
penalties in Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909) as exceeding Congress’s authority. See also 179 F.
110, 112 (9th Cir. 1910).
37. Chu Tai Ngan v. Backus, 226 F. 446, 447 (9th Cir. 1916). But see Chan Kam v. United States, 232 F.
855 (9th Cir. 1916), reversing the order; her statement was taken when she was in jail and not represented
by counsel.
38. In Ex parte Ung King Ieng, 213 F. 119, 121 (N.D. Cal. 1914), the woman was forbidden to crossexamine four witnesses. See also Low Kwai v. Backus, 229 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1916), finding improper
delegation to a local immigration commissioner.
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had relied on confidential communications, denied the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses, or had not disclosed confidential evidence, this could undermine its legality.39 However, the courts required appellants to show that the
proceedings were manifestly unfair, or that executive officers had prevented a fair
investigation or seriously abused their discretion.40 Showing that there had been a
lack of counsel at a preliminary examination or that evidence had come from an
illegal search would not support reversal.41 Even claiming birthright citizenship did
not help. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a woman’s being charged
as a prostitute triggered immigration officials’ jurisdiction, thereby overriding rights
that would ordinarily accrue to citizens: “the burden of proof is not shifted upon
the United States by the fact that the appellant claims to be a citizen of the United
States.”42 Rather, policy makers and courts appeared to agree that the nation’s duty
to protect against an influx of prostitutes and suspected prostitutes warranted
expedient and restrictive action.
Wives who were not suspected of prostitution also struggled to remain in the
United States, especially when they experienced a change of status; only if the
inspectors blundered procedurally did women sometimes succeed.43 However,
courts occasionally made pragmatic rulings benefitting wives, as in the case of
Chan Shee, who offered proof of two separate marriages, one conducted after
deportation proceedings had been initiated. The district court ordered her
admission: even if she were deported, “she could return upon the same boat, with
full right to enter as the unquestionable wife of a domiciled merchant.”44 This case,
however, was an outlier; the outcome was likely driven primarily by a general
judicial interest in conserving institutional resources by forestalling future disputes
that would have obvious winners and losers.
In the second decade of the twentieth century, the balance of reported cases
shifted toward deportation over exclusion, often involving women who had been
in the United States for some time. While inspectors and commissioners had to
follow the statutory procedures, in the face of an even higher tide of anti-immigrant
sentiment, courts increasingly signaled they would not demand high standards or
rigorous due process. As long as Chinese women had formal (if impractical)
opportunities to call and cross-examine witnesses and to consult attorneys, orders
of exclusion or deportation were largely safe from reversal.

39. Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 F. 869, 870 (9th Cir. 1918).
40. Choy Gum v. Backus, 223 F. 487 (9th Cir. 1915).
41. Jung Back Sing v. White, 257 F. 416 (9th Cir. 1919); Tsuie Shee v. Backus, 243 F. 551 (9th Cir. 1917).
42. Chin Ah Yoke v. White, 244 F. 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1917). See also Tsui Shee v. Backus, 243 F. 551 (9th
Cir. 1917).
43. In Ex parte Tsuie Shee, 218 F. 256 (N.D. Cal. 1914), the wrong administrative official heard the
appeal. See also Mah Shee v. White, 242 F. 868 (9th Cir. 1917).
44. Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
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The outcomes for Chinese women between 1920 and 1925 were harsh. In seven
reported cases, only one woman successfully resisted deportation.45 Opinions
illustrated the changed legal environment, facilitating the identification and
removal of undesired residents and making it harder for Chinese people to enter
or remain in the United States. The courts only grudgingly admitted Chinese family
members.46 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized Congress’s discretion
when interpreting new legislation that changed the rules for legal residents post
hoc; claims of procedural irregularity were less successful.47 Court rulings broadly
legitimated administrative decision making as long as it complied with the
(generously defined) parameters for administrative discretion that the courts had
established. At this point, administrative officials held the authority, with very little
oversight, to determine status and make decisions about individuals’ rights to enter
or remain in the country on that basis.
But Congress determined that even the stricter standards and increased
suspicion implemented through the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone Act and the 1921
Emergency Quota Act were insufficient to address fears about immigration. The
tough Immigration Act of 1924 required visas from a U.S. consulate in China for
wives and children of merchants and citizens. The Northern District of California
confronted this requirement in a case involving multiple detained individuals who
sought entry based on their status without the visas. The court rejected the
merchants’ wives’ and children’s claims that they had the right to enter the United
States based on treaties with China. It held that congressional regulation, not
treaties, determined the entry rights of non-citizens. Even for merchants, family ties
alone could not forestall “the right of a sovereign state to dictate…what alien
persons shall be permitted to come within its territorial boundaries.”48 Wives and
children of citizens could have entered if the husbands had obtained proper visas.
But lacking the visas, they had no right to enter.49 The Ninth Circuit Court’s 1924
decree upholding an alleged wife’s deportation illustrated tighter standards: “The
executive department has acted within its powers, and the courts will not
interfere.”50

45. In one case, marriage under Hawaiian territorial law was deemed sufficient to secure a woman’s
status. Halsey v. Ho Ah Keau, 295 F. 636, 637 (9th Cir. 1924).
46. Chan Gai Jan v. White, 266 F. 869 (9th Cir. 1920); Wong Wing Sing v. Nagle, 299 F. 601 (9th Cir.
1924).
47. That is, Chin Shee objected that the Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917 was passed after she had
gained resident status; in response, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized Congress’s discretion
“to exclude or expel aliens, or any class of aliens.” Chin Shee v. White, 273 F. 801, 809 (9th Cir. 1921). See
also Chun Shee v. Nagle, 9 F. 2d 342, 343 (9th Cir. 1925).
48. Ex parte Cheung Sum Shee; Ex parte Chan Shee, 2 F.2d 995, 997, 998 (N.D. Cal. 1924).
49. Contrast with Chan Shee – 236 F. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1916) – who could remain because she could
simply get the appropriate wifely certification and re-enter the country.
50. Leong Shee v. White, 295 F. 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1924).
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Over the years covered in our investigation, courts increasingly declined to
interfere with the results of administrative hearings, as Salyer has shown. Wifely
status no longer protected residents and immigrants, and those suspected of
prostitution had even fewer protections. By 1925, Chinese women could never
rest assured of their right to enter or remain in the United States, and it was
evident that the courts largely would not defend them. Their status, which
determined their access to rights, was now almost fully in the hands of
administrators, who might question it for a variety of reasons based on the
slimmest reeds of suspicion.

Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis
The relationship between rights and status, as it played out in the context of
familial ties, was central in cases involving children’s challenges to orders of
exclusion or deportation but worked out somewhat differently than in the cases
involving women. Most women’s capacity to enter or remain in the United States
depended upon establishing their status based on their familial ties, although the
statutes allowed them to have independent status as laborers. And for women,
access to rights depended with increasing strictness upon the prior determination
of their status. For children in the early portion of the period we are considering,
the place of birth or identification of citizen parents could establish individuals as
potential rights claimants. In the 1880s, courts set a pattern for handling jus soli51
citizenship cases. Justice Field, writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held
that, even absent the certificate required by a law that had passed during a boy’s
sojourn in China, he was clearly “subject to the jurisdiction” of the laws of the
United States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Both parents, including his
merchant father, had resided in Mendocino for 20 years, and the boy’s birth in the
United States was undisputed. He could not be barred from re-entry unless he had
been convicted of a crime. Field noted that the principle of birthright citizenship
pre-dated the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Matthew Deady agreed for the Oregon
Circuit Court soon afterward: the Fourteenth Amendment codified common law,
whereby the status of citizen, “once acquired, can only be lost or changed by
the act of the party when arrived at majority, and the consent of the government.”

51. The United States recognizes two forms of birthright citizenship: jus soli, or citizenship premised
on an individual’s birth on American soil, and jus sanguinis, or citizenship premised on an individual’s
biological descent from an American citizen parent. Children of Chinese could claim citizenship on either
basis, although, as this discussion will explain, Chinese children’s access to jus soli citizenship was
controversial.
52. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C. D. Cal. 1884), citing an 1819 ruling in which a daughter born to
two aliens in the United States was adjudged a citizen.
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The status of an American-born child of a Chinese couple legally within the United
States did not depend on the “political status or condition of its parents.”53
Similarly, two 1888 cases held that the Chinese Exclusion Acts did not apply to
citizens, even if the parents were laborers who had since relocated to China.54 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, acknowledging these precedents, insisted that “no
act of Congress can be understood or construed as a bar to” a judicial determination through the habeas process of a case involving someone claiming to be a
natural born citizen.55 These cases laid the groundwork for the eventual success of
constitutional claims that jus soli citizenship was a right, but individuals’ ability to
claim this right was not always certain. Jus soli citizenship appeared on the surface
to incorporate a liberal frame for citizenship that inferred individual attachment to
the nation based on birth within its borders, but concerns about Chinese potential
for integration into culture and society rendered the children of Chinese, even if
born on American soil, subject to additional scrutiny based on familial ties.56
The landmark Supreme Court case of Wong Kim Ark (1898) constitutionally
established that children born on U.S. soil to Chinese immigrants were citizens, yet
many individuals claiming citizenship on this basis nevertheless faced exclusion or
deportation, filing habeas petitions to secure their civic rights. Wong Kim Ark, a
Chinese laborer’s son born in San Francisco in 1873, resided with his parents until
they returned to China in 1890. That year, he briefly visited China and returned
without incident; he was denied re-entry after an 1894 visit. The California District
Court reluctantly endorsed his admission, because neither governing precedent
nor the common law understanding of citizenship had been repudiated by a
higher court. Only executive action, not judicial fiat, could reverse the existing
common law principle that extended citizenship to individuals born in the United
States.57
The United States appealed this ruling, but lost before the Supreme Court.
Justice Gray, writing for the majority, explained that when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, international law did not contradict the ancient rule of
citizenship by birth within the dominion, and “it is the inherent right of every
independent nation to determine for itself and according to its own constitution
and laws what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.”58 Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s language extending citizenship to those born on
53. Ex parte Chin King; Ex parte Chan San Hee, 35 F. 354, 355–56 (C.C. D. Ore. 1888); emphasis in the
original (at 355).
54. In re Wy Shing combined with In re Wong Gan, 36 F. 553 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1888).
55. Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 49 F. 146 (9th Cir. 1892). However, the court refused to declare
clear error in a finding of fact; at the petitioner’s district court hearing, only Chinese witnesses testified
about his place of birth.
56. See McDonagh, “The Family-State Nexus” (see note 3 above).
57. In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 F. 382, 384, 392 (1896).
58. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 667–68 (1898); quote at 668.
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American soil was well within the nation’s authority to implement, and any
individuals born in the United States could claim citizenship as an entitlement on
this basis.
Nevertheless, immigration officials and even courts often viewed Chinese
people born in the United States as “accidental citizens” – citizens by technicality
alone.59 “Paper sons” who fraudulently claimed relationships with Chinese
American fathers in order to circumvent immigration restrictions attracted suspicion, and officials aggressively demanded proof of those who claimed birthright
citizenship. According to the Geary Act, when a person of Chinese descent was
found to be unlawfully within the United States, that person bore the burden to
satisfy the relevant justice, judge, or commissioner of his lawful right to remain – a
principle that applied to purported citizens as well as to individuals claiming legal
residency.60 This generated tension between the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of birthright citizenship as a constitutional entitlement and Congress’s creation
of administrative discretion to determine status. By 1905, “published government
guidelines instructed immigration officials to judge Chinese applicants ‘excludable
until they could be proven otherwise.’ ”61
At the end of the nineteenth century, court opinions increasingly sustained
administrative decisions to deny entry in cases involving alleged birthright citizens
who had lived for a long time outside the United States (as a number of children of
Chinese parents did). The courts found that mere allegations of citizenship did not
warrant rigorous judicial review.62 For a girl who had left the United States at a very
early age, though purportedly born there, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
claimed that the real question was “whether the evidence is so clear and
satisfactory upon that point as to authorize this court to say that the [lower] court
erred in refusing her to land.” In her case, the circuit court answered this question
in the negative.63 Upholding another young woman’s deportation in 1901, this
court underscored that although lower tribunals could not arbitrarily reject the
testimony of Chinese witnesses, they had wide discretion in determining witness
credibility.64 Judges also disapproved of what they saw as attempts by Chinese
59. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers, 208–09 (see note 14 above) on technical citizens; on accidental
citizens, see Kristin A. Collins, “Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction
of Family, Race, and Nation,” Yale Law Journal 123 (2014): 2134–2235, at 2172–73.
60. United States v. Chun Hoy 111 F. 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1901). See also Chew Hing v. United States 133 F.
227 (9th Cir. 1904).
61. Collins, “Illegitimate Borders,” 2172 (see note 59 above); Erika Lee and Judy Yung, Angel Island:
Immigrant Gateway to America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 84–90; quote at 85, citing Rule 7
from U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Immigration, “Treaties, Laws, Regulations
Relating to the Exclusion of Chinese,” May 1905, 47. Wong Kim Ark himself faced suspicion upon his
subsequent reentries; see Lee and Yung, Angel Island, 84.
62. In re Louie You, 97 F. 580, 581 (D. Ore. 1899). Gee Fook Sing (1892) reached a similar result.
63. Lee Sing Far v. U.S. 94 F. 834, 836 (9th Cir. 1889).
64. Woey Ho v. United States 109 F. 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1901).
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petitioners and their lawyers to game the judicial system by “finding” additional
necessary evidence after a determination had been made.65
In 1905, Justice Holmes, writing for a seven-member majority in United States
v. Ju Toy, found that even if the Fifth Amendment applied to a person who had been
stopped at the border, executive decisions could meet its due process standards.
A mere claim of citizenship was insufficient to trigger judicial review prior to
application of the administrative machinery of exclusion. The majority relied on
precedents upholding unquestioned executive authority in determining noncitizens’ status.66 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court retained some oversight of
administrative determinations in habeas cases involving birthright citizenship
claims. In 1908, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus for the limited purpose
of determining whether “a hearing properly so called was denied” in a case in which
a male was forbidden to obtain testimony or provide witnesses who supported his
claim of birthright citizenship.67
The Ju Toy decision influenced how the Ninth Circuit dealt with jurisdictional
matters in birthright citizenship cases. The ruling produced an environment in
which lower courts increasingly allowed deportations of detainees who purported
to be American citizens, refusing to second-guess the conclusions that lower courts
and commissioners reached based on evidentiary hearings in the absence of a
clear record of arbitrary decision making.68 As one court summarized the core
principle, when executive officers found that individuals were not native-born
citizens, “such action should be treated by the courts as having been made by a
competent tribunal, with due process of law, and as final and conclusive, in the
absence of a showing that there was abuse of discretion on the part of such
executive officers.”69 Deference to fact finding done elsewhere remained marked
until the first World War. Judges repeatedly emphasized the heavy burden of proof
upon the Chinese; only clear evidence of an incorrect conclusion would suffice.70
Thus, administrators had wide latitude to determine status and effectively close off
access to independent judicial determination for individuals who claimed citizenship by virtue of birth in the United States.
For those claiming birth on American soil and those claiming entry as sons
or daughters of citizens, the Ninth Circuit seems to have become slightly more
concerned with procedural fairness during and after the World War. In 1917, an
65. Lee Sing Far v. U.S. 94 F. 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1889).
66. United States v. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905).
67. Chin Yow v. United States 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908).
68. Even Justice Field, who embraced Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship in 1884,
supported administrative denials of landing and lower courts’ denials of writs of habeas corpus amid
questionable evidence. See Quock Ting v. United States 140 U.S. 417 (1891).
69. In re Tang Tun 168 F. 448, 490 (9th Cir. 1909). See also In re Can Pon, 168 F. 479, 483 (9th Cir. 1909).
70. Lee Yuen Sue v. United States, 146 F. 670, 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1906). One 1915 case found clear error –
that of Backus v. Yep Kim Yuen 277 F. 848 (9th Cir. 1915).
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appellate panel found that inconsistencies cited in testimony were trivial and
insufficient to invalidate the other evidence that supported a Chinese male’s claim
to be a natural born citizen.71 A year later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that separate procedures created specifically for Chinese minors under Department of Labor guidelines when they claimed to be sons or daughters of U.S.
citizens were discriminatory, stating: “We know of no law making a race distinction
in American citizenship, and by reason of such distinction excluding the sons of
citizens of the United States of Chinese birth.”72
In addition, several times around 1916, the district court for the Northern District
of California rebuffed the federal Commissioner of Immigration, who had tried to
exclude adult children of U.S. citizens on the grounds that the adults had shown no
interest in the United States as minors or that the citizens themselves were
insufficiently attached, often because they and/or their parents had spent
substantial time abroad. While this might have offered a glimmer of hope for a
few jus sanguinis claimants, the overall pattern from 1915 to 1925 remained that
almost all foreign-born children of U.S. citizens of Chinese origin in our reported
cases were denied entry to the United States and/or were deported.
By the 1910s, Chinese increasingly were claiming citizenship through a
citizen father rather than through their own birth in the United States, possibly
because there were more children of Chinese men who themselves held
jus soli citizenship.73 The default rules of the Bureau of Immigration and the
Department of State extended citizenship far more readily to non-marital foreignborn children of American mothers than to non-marital foreign-born children of
citizen fathers. But the rules, their application, and their administration were
specified by ethnicity and race, and this pattern also prevailed in the courts.74
Chinese children faced particular difficulty in establishing their status based
on familial relations because of widespread distrust and suspicion about
Chinese families, including the perceived tendency of Chinese men to claim as
blood descendants children who were not “their own” in order to help them
enter the United States. These suspicions led to actions contrary to the
implicit framework that justified extending citizenship to the children of
citizens by presuming that civic attachment would be transmitted through family
structure.
For foreign-born children of American citizen fathers of Chinese heritage, the
question often turned upon their legitimacy – or presumed illegitimacy. Children
of such men, born in China, were often challenged when they tried to enter or
71. Yee Chung v. United States, 243 F. 126 (9th Circuit, 1917).
72. Quan Hing Sun et al. v. White, 54 F. 402, 404–05 (9th Cir. 1918).
73. The 1907 Expatriation Act provided that any American woman who married a foreign male took
the nationality of her husband; subsequently, one would have to claim citizenship through a citizen father.
74. Collins, “Illegitimate Borders,” 2158 (see note 59 above).
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re-enter the United States. Even for children genuinely linked to citizens by blood,
if the father’s marriage in China was not exclusive, the child’s landing in the United
States was often challenged and denied. Children of second wives and concubines, who were legitimate heirs in China, were illegitimate in the United States.
Marital exclusiveness mattered in determining the status of foreign-born children of
American fathers and legal residents,75 of those who naturalized prior to the 1882
ban on Chinese naturalization, and of natural born citizens with Chinese parents.
As restrictions tightened, courts broadened the scope for administrative settlement
of these issues, implicitly endorsing administrative agents’ aggressive stances.
Thus, public anxieties about polygamy and immigration triggered officials’ doubts
about Chinese marriages, thereby affecting the fate of women and children seeking
entry to the United States through their family status.76
By around 1920, the Supreme Court hinted at greater concern for procedural
violations in both jus soli and jus sanguinis appeals. That year, an individual who
had followed proper legal procedures – receiving from the Commissioner of
Immigration pre-investigation and clearance of his claim to be an American citizen
by birth, before leaving the United States – was refused re-entry to the country.
Anonymous information had reached the San Francisco Immigration Office that he
was neither who he claimed to be nor born in the United States. The Commissioner
reconsidered his original decision but maintained the denial – a denial upheld by
the district and circuit courts. The Supreme Court identified procedural violations,
reversed the decision of the Secretary of Labor, and remanded the case to the
district court for a trial on the merits. The unanimous opinion stated that the power
that Congress gave to the Secretary of Labor over persons of Chinese descent is “a
power to be administered, not arbitrarily and secretly, but fairly and openly…. It is
the province of the courts, in proceedings for review…to prevent abuse of this
extraordinary power…. It is better that many Chinese immigrants should be
improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of the United States should
be permanently excluded from his country.”77 Likewise, in 1922, the Supreme
Court unanimously granted habeas relief to two individuals, allowing them to
proceed to trial on the question of citizenship, because a claim of citizenship
functioned as “a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”78 Without the protection
of habeas, an executive could order deportation independently “whatever his
[the claimant’s] race or place of birth.” Differentiating the situation in this case
from the ruling in Ju Toy, the Court found that summarily deporting an individual

75. Ibid., 2168.
76. Men were sometimes targeted, too. A merchant working in San Francisco for 30 years was denied
re-entry for ostensibly having two wives in China; San Francisco Call, March 13, 1912.
77. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920).
78. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922), following Chin Yow and Kwock Jan Fat.
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who claimed citizenship fell short of the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due
process of law.79
Courts in the early 1920s occasionally addressed claims that the Secretary of
Labor overstepped his jurisdiction when he acted as final authority on cases in
which persons claimed American citizenship. Notably, during these years the
Supreme Court increasingly engaged arguments about fundamental or foundational rights (speech, press), ruling both to expand the concept of liberty and
to extend protection to some disfavored groups, such as religious minorities, under
its rubric.80 But this broader heightened judicial scrutiny of potential due process
violations came just when the nation was further limiting immigration with literacy
tests and quotas. The stakes for federal courts in flexing their muscles against
arbitrary and capricious executive officers on immigration matters were reduced.
As support for immigration waned and drastic new immigration measures were
instated, nascent rights principles from the Supreme Court received only uncertain
support in the lower federal courts and did little for those of Chinese heritage.

Conclusions
Through this period, courts wrestled with a changing statutory environment in
order to determine the appropriate authority of and limits on administrative
decision making. Judges were no more eager than were policy makers to allow
large-scale Chinese immigration, but the former maintained some minimal
evidentiary and procedural standards in order to manage the rules that mandated
exclusion and deportation and that empowered administrators to determine
immigrants’ status. In doing so, the courts established the scope of their limited
oversight and also legitimated administrative decision making as a final arbiter of
status for many thousands who were swept up in the fervor to exclude Chinese.
Rather than seeing a simple reallocation of power from courts to administration, we have observed a dynamic relationship among federal courts, Congress,
and administrative agencies. The courts played a crucial role in governing the
gradual shift of authority toward administrators and validating the significance of
status, including family status, as the categorical means for allowing or denying
entrance into the United States or continued residence in it. Our study suggests
that, in the matter of Chinese immigration, political conflict was pervasive within
the institutions of the American state. As Orren and Skowronek have pointed out,
79. Ng Fung Ho at 284–85. Despite this ruling’s limits on executive branch jurisdiction when
citizenship was claimed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later interpreted the fair hearing mandate
narrowly in cases involving women.
80. See, for instance, the Court’s rulings in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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“relations among political institutions are (at least) as likely to be in tension as in
fit and the tension generated is an important source of political conflict
and change.”81 In their dynamic conflict for control over the political status of
Chinese women and children, courts and administrative agencies each sought to
shape the evidentiary criteria by which families could be identified. In this way,
family was an important dimension of state-building.
The Constitution and some federal statutes minimally protected the Chinese.
From the Burlingame Treaty in 1868 to the National Origins Act of 1924, the wives
and children of citizens could rely on their husbands’ or fathers’ status because of
policy makers’ accommodations for the families of merchants and broader
principles of citizenship. Their rights to enter or reside in the United States had
eroded by the 1920s. While a married woman could claim either independent
status or her status as a wife, she also experienced a dual threat: doubts raised
about her husband’s status could undercut her own status, and after 1907, any hint
of involvement in prostitution could place her before administrative fact finders
who were empowered to order exclusion or deportation.
Beyond the Fourteenth Amendment citizenship clause, under the Supreme
Court’s uncertain guidance, the lower federal courts sometimes insisted that those
claiming birthright citizenship had Fifth Amendment due process rights concerning the procedures used to assess their evidence. Individuals who could credibly
allege birthright citizenship sometimes could obtain habeas relief. Individuals
claiming jus soli or jus sanguinis citizenship might have their day in court, but for
much of this period, they could not challenge the initial jurisdiction of executive
branch officials, nor could they get very far unless they established that major
procedural or evidentiary blunders had been committed, or that a law had been
misinterpreted. For both women and children, familial status was critically
important and increasingly subject to determination by administrative agents.
Positively identified family status could ground civic status as a rights-bearer, but
for the Chinese, the legislative environment placed them in a continually defensive
posture, with their status as legitimate wives, children, or birthright citizens always
open to further questioning in subsequent proceedings, especially if they left the
United States and sought re-entry, as did quite a few individuals who returned to
China with a parent, or to visit, marry, or conduct business.
Our investigation confirmed that administrative discretion was increasing
during the period we have studied. It also reveals an increase in administrative
suspicion about Chinese families because they did not conform to strong norms
about appropriate American families. Congress both enlarged the administrative
81. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “In Search of Political Development,” in The Liberal
Tradition in American Politics, ed. David F. Ericson and Louisa Bertch Green (New York: Routledge, 1999),
29–42, at 39.
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apparatus and enhanced its authority. This apparatus then acted stringently to limit
Chinese people’s entrance into the United States and threaten their continued
residence in the country. It implemented these limits in accordance with national
concerns about the legitimacy of the family ties claimed by many Chinese
women and children and the capacity of these familial ties to translate a sense of
American belonging. The courts played an important role in establishing and
shifting the boundaries of their own authority, and in legitimating administrative
decisions that definitively determined the status of thousands of individuals and
affected many more.
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